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Security & Compliance

MPL provides a defense-in-depth security architecture purpose-built for AI agent deployments. Rather than bolting security onto existing protocols, MPL embeds governance primitives -- schema enforcement, semantic hashing, provenance tracking, policy evaluation, and quality metrics -- directly into the protocol layer.


Executive Summary

For CISOs and security architects evaluating MPL for enterprise AI deployments:

MPL Security Posture

MPL treats every agent-to-agent message as an untrusted input. The protocol enforces validation, integrity, provenance, and policy compliance at the proxy layer, independent of application code. This means security guarantees hold regardless of the agent framework, LLM provider, or programming language in use.

Key Security Capabilities

Capability Mechanism Purpose
Schema Enforcement JSON Schema validation against registered STypes Prevents malformed or unexpected payloads from reaching agents
Semantic Hashing BLAKE3 over canonicalized payloads Tamper detection across multi-hop agent workflows
Provenance Tracking Agent ID, intent, inputs, consent references Complete audit trail for every data transformation
Policy Engine Declarative YAML rules with matchers Organizational constraint enforcement at protocol level
QoM Metrics Six-dimension quality measurement Continuous quality assurance with configurable thresholds
AI-ALPN Handshake Capability negotiation before work begins Prevents capability escalation and downgrade attacks

Defense-in-Depth Layers

MPL implements security at three distinct layers, each reinforcing the others:

graph TD
    subgraph "Layer 1: Transport Security"
        TLS["TLS 1.3 Encryption"]
        MTLS["Mutual TLS (mTLS)"]
    end

    subgraph "Layer 2: Protocol Security"
        ALPN["AI-ALPN Capability Negotiation"]
        Schema["Schema Validation"]
        Hash["BLAKE3 Semantic Hashing"]
        Prov["Provenance Metadata"]
    end

    subgraph "Layer 3: Application Security"
        Policy["Policy Engine"]
        QoM["QoM Metrics & Thresholds"]
        Consent["Consent Enforcement"]
        Audit["Audit Trail Logging"]
    end

    TLS --> ALPN
    MTLS --> ALPN
    ALPN --> Schema
    Schema --> Hash
    Hash --> Prov
    Prov --> Policy
    Policy --> QoM
    QoM --> Consent
    Consent --> Audit

Threat-to-Control Mapping

The following table maps common AI-specific threats to MPL's security controls and the compliance frameworks they satisfy:

Threat MPL Control Detection Compliance
Prompt Injection Schema validation rejects unexpected fields E-SCHEMA-FIDELITY error SOX, EU AI Act
Data Exfiltration Policy engine enforces data handling rules E-POLICY-DENIED with remediation GDPR, HIPAA
Output Manipulation BLAKE3 semantic hashes detect payload tampering Hash mismatch on verification SOX, UK FCA
Jailbreaking QoM thresholds flag anomalous quality drops E-QOM-BREACH with violation details EU AI Act
Man-in-the-Middle Semantic signatures in provenance verify identity Signature verification failure HIPAA, SOX
Replay Attacks Unique envelope IDs and ISO 8601 timestamps Duplicate ID detection SOX, UK FCA
Schema Poisoning Registry governance with CODEOWNERS approval Pull request review workflow EU AI Act
Capability Escalation AI-ALPN limits negotiated capabilities per session Handshake rejection GDPR, HIPAA

Compliance Coverage

MPL's security controls map to requirements across major regulatory frameworks:

Regulation Key Requirements MPL Controls
SOX Internal controls, audit trails, data integrity Semantic hashing, provenance, QoM reports
GDPR Data minimization, consent, right to explanation Consent references, policy engine, provenance
HIPAA PHI access controls, audit logs, data integrity SType restrictions, QoM thresholds, policy engine
EU AI Act Transparency, explainability, risk management QoM metrics, provenance chains, risk profiles
UK FCA/PRA Fiduciary duty, audit trails, instruction compliance Policy engine, audit trails, compliance checks

Compliance Documentation

See the Compliance Mapping page for detailed requirement-to-control mappings with specific evidence types for each regulation.


Security Architecture

The MPL proxy acts as a security gateway, validating all traffic between agents:

flowchart LR
    subgraph "Client Agent"
        CA[Agent Logic]
        SDK1[MPL SDK]
    end

    subgraph "MPL Proxy (Security Gateway)"
        SV[Schema Validation]
        PE[Policy Engine]
        QE[QoM Evaluation]
        HV[Hash Verification]
        AL[Audit Logger]
    end

    subgraph "Server Agent"
        SA[Agent Logic]
        SDK2[MPL SDK]
    end

    CA --> SDK1
    SDK1 -->|"TLS 1.3"| SV
    SV --> PE
    PE --> QE
    QE --> HV
    HV --> AL
    AL --> SDK2
    SDK2 --> SA

Zero Trust Principle

The MPL proxy validates every envelope regardless of source. Even internal agents communicating within the same cluster are subject to schema validation, policy evaluation, and QoM assessment. There is no implicit trust boundary.


  • Threat Model


    AI-specific threat categories and MPL's layered defenses

    Threat Model

  • Adversarial Robustness


    Attack scenarios, countermeasures, and hardening recommendations

    Adversarial Robustness

  • Compliance Mapping


    Regulation-to-control mapping for SOX, GDPR, HIPAA, EU AI Act

    Compliance Mapping

  • Audit Trails


    Comprehensive auditing with hash chains, provenance, and QoM reports

    Audit Trails


Security Principles

MPL's security design is guided by these principles:

  1. Protocol-level enforcement -- Security guarantees are embedded in the protocol, not delegated to application code
  2. Semantic awareness -- Controls understand the meaning of data, not just its structure
  3. Continuous verification -- Every message is validated, not just the first one in a session
  4. Auditable by default -- All decisions produce structured evidence for compliance review
  5. Defense in depth -- Multiple independent layers prevent single-point failures
  6. Least privilege -- AI-ALPN ensures agents can only access negotiated capabilities
  7. Fail closed -- Schema, policy, or QoM failures result in rejection, never silent pass-through

Next Steps